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The
true system, the real system, is our present construction of
systematic thought itself, rationality itself.… There's so much
talk about the system. And so little understanding. (Robert
M.
Pirsig, Zen or the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance, 1975,
p. 94)
"The
system," our construction of rationality
In his novel Zen and the Art of Motorcycle
Maintenance, Pirsig (1975) explains to his son Chris what
it means to maintain a motorcycle. The key is to see the technological
artifacts and systems that surround us as ideas rather
than objects. A motorcycle consists of parts made of metal,
yes; but whether and how well it works depends on the understanding
and care that flow into its construction and maintenance. The
true system we call "motorcycle" is really a system
of concepts – a mental construct – worked out in steel:
That's
all the motorcycle is, a system of concepts worked out in steel.
There's no part in it, no shape in it, that is not out of someone's
mind.… I've noticed that people who have never worked with steel
have trouble seeing this – that the motorcycle is primarily
a mental phenomenon. They associate metal with given shapes
– pipes, rods, girders, tools, parts – all of them fixed and
inviolable, and think of it as primarily physical. But the person
who does machining or foundry work or forge work or welding
sees "steel" as having no shape at all. Steel can
be any shape you want if you are skilled enough, and any shape
but the one you want if you are not. Shapes, like this
tappet,
are what you arrive at, what you give to the steel. Steel
has no more shape than this old pile of dirt on the engine here.
These shapes are all out of someone's mind. That's important
to see. The steel? Hell, even the steel is out of someone's
mind. There's no steel in nature. Anyone from the Bronze Age
could have told you that. All nature has is a potential
for steel. There's nothing else there. But what's "potential"? That's also in
someone's mind!… Ghosts. (Pirsig, 1974, p. 94f)
The
"ghosts" to which Pirsig refers at the end of this
short extract are the ghosts of
rationality, rationalities that we construct ourselves in our
minds by the way we conceive of the "systems" that
surround us – not only those worked out in steel but
also the institutions and governance systems by which we run
our societies. The rationality of systems lies in the minds
of those who design and control them. Due to the subjective and often self-serving
nature of such rationalities, they risk leading us away from
true knowledge and understanding and thus also from true rationality
and improvement of practice. This kind of alienation
of prevalent notions of rationality from people's experience
and needs is what ordinary citizens mean when they
refer to the responsible instances and administrative structures
of their societies as "the system" – the impoverished
constructions of rationality they see embodied in these instances
and structures and which are not really connected with their
own experiences, needs, and hopes, yet shape their everyday
reality. "The
true system," as Pirsig (1975, p. 94) puts it in the
motto cited at the outset, "is our present construction
of systematic thought itself, rationality itself."
The
reference systems of which we speak in boundary critique
are ideal-typical reconstructions of such rationality perspectives.
They are "ideal-typical" in that they
hardly ever occur empirically in pure form; rather, they shape
real-world practice in constantly changing combinations and situational adaptations. They can help us understand the rationality
perspectives that inform claims to relevant knowledge and rational
action. In what ways are such claims selective as to
the facts and values they consider relevant, and partial
as to the parties that are likely to benefit?
Critical
systems thinking Systems
thinking has long assumed that taking a "systems approach"
– conceiving of situations or issues in terms of relevant whole
systems, with a consequent effort of
"sweeping
in" a broad range of circumstances and considerations
(Singer, 1957; Churchman, 1968, 1982) – can help us avoid
such selectivity and partiality and thus can secure a higher
degree of rationality than conventional analytical thinking
can. In practice though, the quest for comprehensiveness is
bound to fail inasmuch as it finds
no natural limit. It is a
meaningful effort but not an arguable claim. Accordingly,
the sweep-in principle cannot resolve or avoid the problem of
the inevitable selectivity and partiality of all practical claims
to relevant knowledge, rational action, and resulting improvement.
Rationality and selectivity are inseparable siblings, regardless
of whether we take a systems approach or not. This is why in
my work on critical systems heuristics (CSH),1)
the principle
of boundary critique – the requirement of promoting
a reflecting and transparent employment of the boundary judgments
that are constitutive of our reference systems – had ultimately
to
replace Singer and Churchman's sweep-in principle as a methodological
core principle of systemic thought and practice (Ulrich,
2004, p. 1128).
Rationality
and
reference systems Critical systems thinking begins
when we first realize that our reference systems of thought
and action (S) do not usually comprise all the aspects
of the universe (U) that might conceivably be relevant and on
which our claims may consequently depend (Fig. 1).
Fig.
1: Reference system vs.
universe
U
= universe; S = current reference system of thought and action.
Critical systems thinking begins when we realize that our reference
systems (S) for judging situations and for assessing related
claims may (and as a rule, do) not comprise all the aspects
(or conditions, circumstances) of the universe (U) that would
allow conclusive arguments to systemic rationality.
We
may refer to the unknown section of the universe that in a specific
situation or issue would allow conclusive arguments to sufficient
knowledge, rational action, and resulting improvement as the
"relevant whole system" (W).
The difficulty is, we do not and cannot usually know W, for it represents
a totality of conceivably relevant conditions or of related
circumstances, concerns, and ideas and as such lies beyond
the reach of empirical knowledge or, in any case, beyond what
from a critical point of view we should assume to know for sure.
There is, in this sense, a critical difference between
S and W (Fig. 2).
Fig.
2: The "critical difference"
in systems thinking
The
proper reference system for arguing claims is not a matter of
course but rather, a matter of discourse! U = universe; S = current
reference system of thought and action; W = the "whole relevant system"=
the totality of
circumstances and concerns that in principle would allow for
conclusive argumentation of related claims to knowledge, rationality,
or improvement, but which in practice we can hardly ever claim to fully
and securely know.
We
are facing an eternal dilemma of reason: the
quest for considering everything possibly relevant is as unachievable
in practice as it is indispensable in theory. Assuming that
we can live up to it and indeed consider everything relevant
leads to dogmatism (e.g., in the form of boundary judgments
taken for granted); abandoning it, to uncontrolled deficits
of rationality (e.g., in the form of neglected "external
effects" and suboptimization). Responding to the dilemma
by discarding the systems idea does not help either, for that
would merely mean to accuse the messenger of causing the bad
news it brings us. But the systems idea is neither the cause
nor the solution of the problem, it is only the messenger. The
only reasonable way out is to take the messenger seriously and
choose the critical path, that is, undertake a systematic
effort of dealing carefully and openly with the deficits
of knowledge and rationality in question. While we cannot avoid
such deficits, we can at least deal carefully with them and
make an effort to lay them open to all those concerned. We can
trace their sources in the assumptions of fact and value that
guide us. We can analyze their actual or potential consequences,
that is, the ways they may affect people. And we can then assess
the claims in question in the light of these assumptions and
consequences and can qualify (i.e., specify and limit) their
meaning and validity accordingly. That is what critical systems
thinking and its central methodological principle of boundary
critique are all about.
The
critical path or how to handle reference systems Given
the importance of reference systems for our constructions of
rationality, a critical path will have to dedicate special attention
to their choice and handling. In particular, it will not allow
the systems perspective, with its focus on a system or situation
of interest (S), to become the only reference system for claims
to knowledge and rationality. Accordingly, from a critical systems
point of view, our handling of (S) should never assume that:
- S
= the only reference system that matters for adequate and
rational practice;
- S
= W, that is, the system or situation of interest exhausts
the totality of relevant conditions, circumstances,
and concerns (a basic error of thought to which
virtually all conventional systems thinking submits);
- W
= S + E, that is, the system of concern (S) and its
environment (E) exhaust the "relevant whole system"
(W) or even the total conceivable universe of discourse
(U); and that
- we
ever have sufficient knowledge of W or even U to fully
justify our claims regarding S and E.
Critical
systems thinking (CST) is to avoid these common pitfalls
of conventional systems thinking. They all are rooted in
a mistaken identification of S with W, that is, in a tendency to elevate S to the only reference system considered
for judging rationality. This is why CST is essentially
about what above we have called the "critical difference"
between S and W:
CST
= f (Δ{W-S})
To
be sure, the notion of a whole relevant system (W) is a vague
and problematic one. I use it rarely and for critical purposes
only, that is, as a conceptual tool that reminds us of the
inevitable imitations of any reference systems S on which we
may choose to rely. The essential methodological consequence
of this reminder is that we need to resist the temptation of
making the system of primary interest or concern an unquestioned reference
system for assessing claims. To put it perhaps a bit more succinctly,
a basic imperative of critical systems thinking is this:
Never
try to solve "the problem" of the system
without
also making "the system" the problem.
Thus
understood, critical systems thinking always faces us with the
question of whether the situation or context considered
provides the proper reference system for identifying relevant
"facts" and "values" and for accordingly
justifying claims to relevant knowledge, rational action, and
genuine improvement. Consequently we should always ask:
What
"critical difference" might a shift of perspective
make,
from the assumed system of concern (S) to different
notions
of the whole relevant system (W)?
It
is with a view to making this question a focus of systematic
methodological attention – in short, to "making the
system the problem" – that in my work on critical systems
heuristics (CSH), I have found it useful to rely on a standardized
basic typology of reference systems (Ulrich, e.g., 1998 and
2017d). We may then understand such a typology as a basic conceptualization
of the "critical difference" between S and W.
A typology of reference systems
for boundary critique To guide systematic
reflection on the conditioned nature and limited reach of our
claims – to practice boundary critique, that is – CSH
relies on these four ideal-typical
rationality perspectives:
S
– the situation of concern or system of primary interest;
E
– the relevant environment or decision-environment;
A
– the context of application or of responsible
action; and
U
– the total conceivable universe of discourse or
of potentially relevant circumstances (see Ulrich, 2017d, pp.
17-28).
CSH
takes these four types of reference systems to embody four fundamentally
different rationality perspectives, each of which is essential
for a systematic practice of boundary critique and is accordingly
also informing some of the boundary questions that together
make of the standard checklist of boundary questions used in
CSH.2) (The French
word seau – whence comes the acronym S-E-A-U – means as much as bucket, pot, or
pail and is thus apt to remind us of the idea that all four
perspectives belong to the toolbox of boundary critique.) In
what follows, I would like first to briefly explain why the
four reference systems are actually needed (i.e., what is the
underlying logic) and
then to take a closer look at the rationality perspectives they
embody (i.e., how does this logic translate into rational practice).
Two related
core concepts will be what I call "the missing element"
in the conventional logic of systems thinking and a resulting
"three-level concept of rational practice" for critical systems thinking and practice.
"The
Missing Element" The way I introduced
the four types of reference systems in Part 1 of the previous
essay (Ulrich, 2017b) was in terms of the kind of boundary judgments that
shape our mental constructions of "the system" and
which consequently allow us to trace the selectivity of related
claims. A slightly different way is to
look at the criteria for what "matters" in a situation
and how what matters is related to S. Four such relations are logically
possible (Fig. 3).
Fig.
3: The "missing element"
in systems thinking
Conventional
systems thinking is based on the systems / environment distinction.
By assuming that the universe of discourse is exhausted by the
reference systems S and E, such thinking leaves open the question
of the nature and relevance of the "missing element"
located in the red box, apart from tacitly narrowing the meaning
of "relevance" to what matters to S.
U
= universe; S = system of primary interest or concern; E = relevant
environment (relevant, that is, to S); ? = "missing element"
= gap in the argumentation logic of conventional systems thinking
Of
these four relationships, three (S-E-U) can easily be understood
in terms of the conventional reference systems of systems thinking,
that is, the system of primary interest or concern (S), the
relevant environment (E), and the remaining universe (U, also
called the "irrelevant environment"). The boundary
judgments that this conventional logic of systems thinking requires
are (a) the delimitation of S from E (S/E) and (b) the
delimitation of the environment considered relevant from
that considered irrelevant (E/U). But what about the fourth
relationship, the one marked by the red box in Fig. 3?
In conventional systems thinking, this fourth basic relationship
appears to be an empty class, as no corresponding reference
system is identified and dealt with systematically, that is,
as a constituent of any claim to systemic rationality. There
is a gap here in the argumentation logic of conventional systems
thinking that I have hardly ever found to be recognized and
systematically questioned.
The
"context of application" This fourth
relationship is what in CSH is called the "context of application"
or also the "context of responsible action" or of
accountability. It is a mandatory
part of the suggested S-E-A-U formula of boundary critique (Fig. 4);
but as far as conventional systems thinking is concerned, it
has remained a "missing element" in its table
of reference systems.
Fig.
4: The "context of
application" in critical systems thinking
In
conventional systems thinking, situational aspects or conditions
that influence the system of primary interest but which cannot be
controlled by it are considered "environment" in the
sense that they constitute the system's relevant decision-environment
(E). As they condition the outcome of systemic rationality or,
in everyday terms, the system's success, there is an intrinsic
interest to take the thus-understood environment
into account. This is different from the context of application
(A), which comprises all those situational aspects that are
affected by (claims to) systemic rationality or, in everyday
terms, by the system, but have no influence on it (i.e., the
way rationality is defined and measured). A, then, is not part
of the relevant environment E of S but rather, S is environment
for A. Accordingly the implications of systemic rationality
for interests and concerns treated as A are often neglected
or considered as "external effects" about which one
cannot do much, rather than as a systematic part of all claims
to rationality.
The
designation of A as "context of application" comes
from science-theory, which conventionally distinguishes between
three methodologically different tasks of research, concerning
its proper handling of the contexts of discovery, of justification,
and of application of scientific propositions. The aim is to
narrow the relevant context for validating propositions so that
the circumstances of their emergence as well as the practical
applications to which they lend themselves may be considered
irrelevant for their justification. In distinction to this conventional
view, the point of introducing A as a reference system for judging
claims is of course that in the applied disciplines, and indeed
in all inquiry that may eventually be put to practical use (that
is, in virtually all forms of inquiry), considering the context
of application is essential for justifying claims. In
fact, it makes sense to conceive of the justification of all
practical claims – to relevant knowledge, rational practice,
and resulting improvement – in terms of the context of application,
regardless of whether their context of discovery is science
or everyday experience, for the selectivity of the claims in
question remains the same. Well-understood science distinguishes
itself from other forms of research and practice not by being
free of selectivity but rather, by laying it open. We can then define the context of application
quite generally as the real-world context in which a claim's
consequences, when used as a basis for action, become manifest
and should be systematically examined and justified.
There
have been a number of efforts in recent decades to do more justice
to the context of application (see, e.g., Beck, 1992, 1995;
Gibbons et al., 1994; and Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1993, 1995);
but neither the prevalent science-theory nor the dominating
research practice appear to have taken much notice of them.
Originating in the Vienna Circle's tradition of logical empiricism
(e.g., Carnap, 1937; Ayer, 1936; Reichenbach, 1938) and in Popper's
(1959, 1963, 1972) subsequent work on critical rationalism, the prevalent model of science
today has remained focused on the "context of justification"
as distinguished from the "context of discovery,"
a distinction first introduced by Reichenbach (1938, pp. 6f,
382) and later particularly emphasized by Popper. Even less importance is given in this model to
the "context of application," the real-world situations
in which scientific knowledge becomes "applied science"
and in which accordingly it is supposed to secure successful and
rationally defensible practice, that is, ultimately,
some kind of improvement of the human condition. In any case,
what I wrote about the issue
some thirty years ago still remains a continuing challenge:
Epistemologists
such as Karl. R. Popper (1959, 1963, 1972) have claimed that
the context in which science is applied is relatively irrelevant
for the justification of its propositions. In distinction to
this position, I propose to understand – and indeed define –
applied science as the study of contexts of application. Of
course this definition renders the distinction between the two
contexts obsolete. From an applied-science point of view, the distinction
is really quite inadequate: to justify the propositions
of applied science can only mean to justify its effects upon
the context of application under study. (Ulrich, 1987, p. 276)
In
an age in which virtually all science sooner or later tends
to become applied science and in which, conversely, ever more
realms of practice are influenced by scientific research and
professional expertise, the distinction between the context
of justification and the context of application has indeed become
obsolete. This is the more so if one considers how frequently research-based
practice produces adverse external effects, cases of obvious
suboptimization, and
situations of "organized irresponsibility" (Beck,
1992, 1995). The implication can only be that the context of application
is rapidly becoming an indispensable part of the context of
justification. Yet in conventional
systems thinking, as in many other fields and methodologies
of inquiry, the context of application is still not systematically
considered.
Environment vs. context of application There is a frequent
confusion in that calls for considering the "environment"
are mistaken to ensure a concern for the context of application.
However, in systems thinking and in the many fields that have
been influenced by it, the relevant "environment"
is usually understood in a different way. The focus is on a
system's decision-environment, that is, the situational
aspects or conditions that influence the system of primary interest
but cannot be controlled by it. As they co-produce the system's
success or, in the terms of CSH, condition the outcome of systemic
rationality, there is an intrinsic interest on the
part of those involved to take the thus-understood
environment into account. Accordingly it is also called the "relevant environment,"
meaning that part of the environment which has repercussions
on the system. In this sense, then, systems management
– the pursuit of systems rationality – includes environmental
management, though not necessarily a stance of ecological concern.
We are dealing with a managerial understanding of the environment
that has little to do with what the concept of the application
context intends; in fact it runs counter to it.
Those
involved vs. those affected In
distinction to the relevant environment (E), the context of application
(A) comprises all those situational aspects that are affected
by "the system" or related claims to systemic rationality
but which are not included in the reference system for assessing
systems rationality or success. In consequence, the context
of application tends to be
taken into account – in short, to "count" – systematically only inasmuch as it happens to coincide
with S or E, which is the case to the extent the affected parties have
ways to influence the way "systems rationality" is defined
or to coproduce a corresponding measure of "success."
For the rest, S is relevant environment for A rather
than the other way round. The methodologically essential focus
will therefore be on those situational aspects – concerned
parties or interests – that are treated as A only. The crucial boundary issue concerns
the delimitation of those affected but not involved from
those affected who are also involved (A/S). A graph offered
in two previous publications may make this clearer than many
words, I reproduce it here for the reader's convenience (Fig. 5).
References to "those affected"or simply to "A," unless otherwise
specified, will accordingly
be understood to focus on the group of those affected
but not involved.
Fig.
5: Those involved vs. those affected but not involved,
and
how they relate to the two reference systems (S) and (A)
S = system (or
situation) of primary interest, A = context of
application, U = universe. While
A as delimited from U (A/U) includes all those
affected and thus provides the basic reference system for responsible
action, the crucial boundary issue is often how those affected
but not involved (A/S) are treated. (Source: adapted from
Ulrich, 1983, p. 248, and reproduced from Ulrich, 2017d,
p. 23, cf. pp. 19-27 for definition and discussion of reference systems E,
A, and U.)
The
context of application vs. the universe Remains
the fourth reference system, the universe (U). Apart from being
a logically needed residual category, it takes on a specific
methodological meaning when it comes to dealing critically with
the normative3)
content of systems rationality:
it refers us to the Kantian principle of moral universalization,
better known as Kant's (1786) "categorical imperative."
The idea is to question the way we delimit the context of application
– the external effects and concerns to be considered – as distinguished
from the universe of all other, actual or conceivable, known
or unknown external effects, many of which may be beyond closer
consideration. Kant's idea was that a subjective norm (or maxim,
as he says) of action cannot count as morally arguable and in
this sense rational unless all those affected could in principle
agree. The difficulty is, how do we know whether they could?
Kant invented the categorical imperative as a practical
universalization test: it asks us to put ourselves in
the place of all those effectively or conceivably concerned
and check whether we could then still find the maxim in question
to be arguable, and thus generalizable (i.e., a general norm
of action rather than just a subjective maxim). In our epoch,
Apel (1972) and Habermas (1990) have uncovered the communicative
kernel of the categorical imperative and hence have translated
it into a model of rational practical discourse, an idea
that is beyond adequate discussion in this Postscript but which
I have discussed extensively on a number of other occasions
(see Ulrich, 2009a-c; 2010a, b; 2011b; 2013; 2015). Suffice
it here to note that (U) is a relevant reference system inasmuch
as in morally arguable practice, the delimitation of A against
U is to be considered no less carefully than all other boundary
issues (S/E, E/U, and A/S).
The
"three-level concept of rational
practice" In his ground-breaking
work on "ideal-types" of rational action,4)
the German sociologist Max Weber (e.g., 1968, pp. 6-9, 20f)
distinguished between social and nonsocial action on the one
hand and between rational and nonrational action on the other.
Action is "social" when it is oriented towards mutual
understanding in the double sense of sharing individual ideas
about what is good and rational action with others and trying
to find agreement on them; it is "nonsocial" when
it is oriented towards securing one's owns interest or success
by means of purposive-rational action. Further, action is "rational"
rather than "nonrational" to the extent it is guided
consciously and coherently by either of these two orientations,
with the added benefit that an objective interpretive can better
recognize it as such. From these distinctions Weber derived
four (in practice: more or less) coherent types of action,
the intrinsic logic of which an observer can rationally
understand (in the order of decreasing weight of rational as
compared to empathetic understanding):
–
purpose-rational action uses efficacious means
for reaching ends;
– value-rational action
is consistent with underlying values;
– affectual
action responds to empathetic or emotional reasons;
and
– traditional action follows individual
habit and social custom
(cf.
Weber, 1968, esp. p. 24f).
Weber's
account is complex and need not concern us here in any more
detail, the more as interested readers will find my understanding
of it explained elsewhere (Ulrich, 2012b, pp. 4-18). For our
present purpose it will be quite sufficient to rely on a helpful
revision of Weber's typology by Jurgen Habermas (1984, pp. 284-288),
a revision that was motivated by the attempt to incorporate
the "communicative" side of rational action, along
with a shift of perspective from that of an understanding observer
(aim: "interpretive social science") to that
of a responsible agent (aim: "theory of communicative
action").
Like
Weber, Habermas starts by distinguishing situations of social
from nonsocial action. But he then adds a distinction that matters
for identifying the quality of social action, between "consensus-oriented"
(or communicative) and "success-oriented" (or noncommunicative)
orientation, rather than just distinguishing with Weber between
rational and not so rational orientation (the latter distinction
is implicit in the proper use of ideal-types). It helps to understand
the intent of the additional distinction by recalling Habermas'
(1971) earlier, largely parallel distinction between "work"
and "interaction" as two fundamental dimensions of
practice that go back to Aristotle's concepts of poiesis
(work, production) and praxis (action, interaction).
Cross-tabulating the two distinctions yields three basic types
of rational action, one standing for a "nonsocial"
type of rationality and the others for two variants of the "social"
type (Table 1).
|
Table 1: Social
and nonsocial types of rational action
(Source: adapted
from Habermas 1984, p. 285, cf. Ulrich, 2012b,
p. 26 )
|
|
Action
situation
|
Action
orientation
|
|
Noncommunicative:
"Success"
(own
interest)
|
Communicative:
"Consensus"
(mutual
understanding)
|
|
Nonsocial
|
Instrumental
action
|
—
— —
|
|
Social
|
Strategic
action
|
Communicative
action
|
|
Copyleft 
2012 W. Ulrich
|
"Instrumental"
action represents a type of nonsocial action that is
oriented toward what Weber called purpose-rationality, a rationality
that is defined by the choice of efficacious means for achieving
given ends. As Habermas puts it, it pursues a type of rationality
that in its pure form is not oriented towards securing mutual
understanding as a value of its own but only towards securing
"success" in the limited sense of reaching the end
as fully and efficiently as possible. By definition, then, there
is no "communicative" variant of nonsocial action
and for this reason, the corresponding box in the table remains
an empty class. Such a type of rationality, if it existed, would
violate Weber's requirement of a recognizable internal "logic"
or coherence; in the terms of Habermas, an agent cannot adopt
a nonsocial orientation (i.e., prioritize a private utilitarian
rather than a communicative and cooperative agenda) yet claim
to be oriented towards mutual understanding or "consensus"
rather than "success."
"Strategic"
and "communicative" action, by contrast, both represent
types of social action. Since such action may be oriented
towards either success or consensus, there are two ideal-types
of socially rational action. When oriented primarily to success,
social action is interested in the concerns of others only in
the opportunistic sense of securing its own success by taking
into account their intentions and actions; it represents a "strategic"
type of rationality rather than a "communicative"
orientation in the full sense of securing mutual understanding
and cooperation. This latter orientation is what "communicative
rationality" as Habermas understands it is about; the ideal-typical
focus is on reaching "consensus" rather than "success"
or, to put it differently, its notion of success is oriented
towards a type of rational action that is coordinated discursively,
by "communicative practice" rather than merely strategic
behavior (cf. Habermas, 1984, p. 101).
The
merit of Habermas' reading of Weber's typology of rational action
is that it lends itself to much further reaching critical use.
This is so because it overcomes several of the difficulties
in Weber's attempt to clarify the meaning of rational action
within his framework of interpretive social science, I mean
particularly its identification of purpose-rationality with
the most rational type of action and its lacking grasp of the
social (meaning both intersubjective and societal) dimension
of well-understood "rational" practice. As I would
argue, Weber's inadequate grasp of what rational social
practice means is rooted precisely in his focus on interpretive
social science: it caused him to mistake the internal
"logic" or coherence of individual action for a major
criterion of socially rational action. Such a perspective is
meaningful for an interpretive
observer, but not for a responsible agent. Weber ended up elevating
purpose-rationality to the highest level of his typology of
rational action simply because it is the type of rational action
that is most easily recognized – or as Weber might put it, the
internal logic of which is most easily interpreted – by an objective
observer. The result is a fundamental confusion between the
rationality of the social scientist's understanding on the one
hand and that of the social practice to be understood on the
other hand. As the former moves into focus, the latter becomes
blurred and ultimately vanishes from sight (see Ulrich, 2012b,
p. 19f).
Integrating
the communicative dimension of rational action, among other
important merits such as its opening up the perspective of a
discursive concept of rationality, has the advantage of overcoming
Weber's fixation on purpose-rationality and thereby opening
up new horizons for rational critique and improvement of social
practice. As Habermas puts it:
The
theory of communicative action can make good the weaknesses
we found in Weber's action theory, inasmuch as it does not remain
fixated on purposive rationality as the only aspect under which
action can be criticized and improved. (Habermas, 1984, p. 332)
Three
types of rationality critique Let us see,
then, how this basic typology of rational action might be put
to critical use within a framework of critical systems thinking
and practice. To this end we need to clarify the relations between the three ideal-types
of rationality – instrumental, strategic, and communicative
–
a bit more. How precisely should we understand and handle their
basically complementary, yet in practice often conflicting,
nature? Is there a way to use them
so that together they can ensure rational practice? And
hence, do they lend themselves to constructing a practicable,
integrated model of rational practice?
I
propose that a satisfactory answer depends on a transition from
Kant's (1786,
1787) two-dimensional concept of reason (theoretical vs. practical
reason), which we still recognize in the framework of Habermas
(success vs. consensus, work vs. interaction, noncommunicative
vs. communicative rationality), to an integrated, hierarchical
concept. A multi-level conception of
rational practice converts the merely "horizontal"
addition of practical reason to theoretical-instrumental
reason into a vertically integrated conception,
so that practical reason is construed as a higher
(or perhaps better, richer) level of rationality that incorporates all lower levels.
I have long since used such a framework in my work on critical
systems thinking (see esp. Ulrich, 1988, pp. 146-160; 2001b, pp. 79-82; and 2012b,
pp. 31-34); but its focus was on integrating the normative
dimension of systems rationality into contemporary,
science-based and often also one-sidedly technical and/or
managerial notions of rationality, rather than on operationalizing
boundary critique. In short, the aim was to explain the nature
of rational practice, while now it is to explain the reference
systems for boundary critique. Here, then, is the latest version of my three-level concept
of rational practice (Table 2).
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For a hyperlinked overview of all issues
of "Ulrich's Bimonthly" and the previous "Picture of the
Month" series,
see the site map
PDF file
Note: This
s a postscript to the preceding two-part
essay on "Systems thinking as if people mattered"
(Ulrich, 2017d, e). It takes up the notion of reference systems
for boundary critique and aims to cast a little more light on
the different rationalities they embody, by situating them
in the author's earlier three-level concept of rational practice
(Ulrich, 1988, 2001b, and 2012b).
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This
new version of the model now explicitly ties the quest for rational practice to
systematic boundary critique, which thus becomes an integral
requirement of all applied rationality critique. To each of its three levels of systems rationality,
the model assigns a
conforming type of reference systems, as defined in the S-E-A-U
formula of boundary critique. Conversely, the scheme can be
understood to work out the different rationality perspectives
for which the reference systems stand. The explanation thus
works in both ways: rationality perspectives can be explained
in terms of boundary critique, and boundary critique in terms
of rationality perspectives.
A
further,
essential element of a proper understanding and employment of
the model consists in what I propose to call the principle of critically
vertical integration of systems levels. Since introducing
it requires a bit more space, I will do so in a separate, concluding
subsection below. First, I suggest we very briefly consider
some of the main theoretical merits of a multi-level conception
of rational
practice and then illustrate its practical implications – the
difference it can make for our understanding of rational practice –
by means of two examples.
Regarding
the more theoretical merits, there are some rather
obvious advantages of the shift from a horizontal to a vertical
understanding of systems rationalization. Conventional
horizontal conceptions of systems rationality
locate gains of rationality primarily in an expansion of systems boundaries;
they have therefore tended to overlook the need for not only enlarging
but also questioning and changing the reference systems presupposed
in claims to rationality. At the same time, they have found
it difficult (and have usually failed) to integrate the normative/communicative dimension
of rationality, that is, to give it a systematic place
in the quest for rational practice and in conforming efforts
of rationality critique. A multi-level framework can help to reduce these difficulties
along the following lines (I'll content myself with simply
listing them, without
discussing them any further):
(1)
Most basically, the framework puts the three ideal-types of
rational action (as summed up in Table 1 and emerging from
the sociological tradition of Weber and Habermas) into a compelling
yet simple order and thereby clarifies their meaning and
mutual relationship.
(2)
It connects the three Weberian
/ Habermasian ideal-types of rational action with the
two traditions of practical philosophy and of systems
theory, and thereby corrects a fundamental
deficit of Weber's typology of rational action, it's not being
grounded in practical philosophy, along with the missing recognition
of the role of boundary critique in Habermas' work.
(3)
It gives new meaning and practical significance to Kant's two-dimensional conception of reason and thereby
to his demand for the primacy of practical reason, thus helping
us to breathe new life into practical philosophy and to pragmatize these two basic ideas
of it.
(4)
It enriches the "horizontal" thrust of conventional
systems thinking, towards expanding systems boundaries, by a
methodologically more fruitful "vertical" perspective
of conceptual levels of progressive rationalization of systems
(compare on this Feibleman's notion of "integrative
levels" as discussed in the concluding section on "vertical
integration").
(5)
It integrates the communicative turn of our understanding of
rationality, as introduced by Karl-Otto Apel (e.g., 1972) and
Jurgen Habermas (e.g., 1984), into the practice of rationality
critique and thereby paves the way for a critically-normative
and discursive concept of rationality, another missing element
in the prevalent, scientifically oriented conception of reason.
(6)
Last but not least, it systematically relates the three ideal-types
of rationality to the reference systems for boundary critique
proposed by the S-E-A-U scheme of CSH and thereby is apt to
deepen our understanding of both, the idea of a three-level
concept of rational practice and the meaning of the related
reference
systems for boundary critique.5)
It is
obviously the last of these six points that interests us here particularly.
Understanding Weber's
and Habermas' ideal-types of rational action in the terms of
corresponding reference systems for boundary critique is to my
knowledge a new idea. More importantly, I see in it the key
for developing a conception of critically-normative practice
that unlike Habermas' (1979, 1990, 1993) ideal conception of
discursive rationality, which ties rational consensus to ideal
conditions of practical discourse, is both theoretically convincing
and practically achievable. This is so because boundary critique
allows critical argumentation on all aspects and implications
of claims to rationality, including its normative implications,
without depending on conditions of perfect rationality. Quite
the contrary, as it does not depend on any particular knowledge
or skills that ordinary citizens would not be able to have,
boundary critique is apt to promote a new kind of symmetry
of critical competence among experts, decision-makers, and
citizens so that they can all meet as equals (see Ulrich, 1993
and 2000).
At
the same time, I should emphasize that the six listed points are interdependent.
Together, they open up a systematic perspective
for bringing back in to our contemporary conception of rationality
the practical-normative dimension that has largely been lost
with the rise of science and the expansion
of theoretical-instrumental rationality it brought. At good
last, we may hope to find some systematic ways for "disciplining"
the dominance of instrumental rationality, and thus to recover
some of the lost balance between theoretical and practical reason:
Both
philosophically and pragmatically speaking, … the quest for
rational action needs to break through the usual dominance of
theoretical-instrumental rationality. To this end, we need to
"discipline" the use of theoretical-instrumental rationality
by subjecting it to the primacy of practical reason, thus advancing
from a state of mere co-existence of theoretical and practical
reason ("mere" in that it remains methodologically
undefined and gives us no orientation as to how to handle their
clash) to an understanding of rational practice that gives practical
reason a chance. (Ulrich, 2012b, p. 32)
Such
an understanding of rational practice should
make it definitely clear that the three
underlying ideal-types of rational action do not embody meaningful
alternatives, not any more than Kant's two dimensions of reason
do. Rather, they are part and parcel of an integrated concept
of levels of systems rationalization, whereby each level is
characterized by a specific type
of reference system for rationality critique (which in turn
is supported boundary critique). Although in
actual practice the three levels may of course be developed
to varying degrees, it is clear that good practice depends on
giving due consideration to all three levels, as each depends for its
full rationalization on the other two. Any
gains of rationality at the two higher levels must build on
the two lower levels, and at the same time, the upper levels must
provide
orientation to the good use of the lower levels. The scheme
thus suggests that the handling of each level is deficient so
long as it is not informed and supported by the other two. Consequently,
the three rationality perspectives
each also lend themselves to critical use with respect to the other
two, in addition to their relevance for examining claims at
their own level of systems rationalization. Accordingly, the
three-level concept of rational practice can also usefully be
understood as a framework for applied rationality critique.
To
illustrate the practical relevance of the three levels of critique
and the ways they are tied to the reference systems
S, E and A, I have added in the right-hand column of Table 2
an example of their interpretation in the field of corporate
management.6)
In management terms we can understand the
three rationality perspectives of S, E, and A to focus on these
three management levels (beginning with the lowest level):
–
operational systems management, in which the focus is
on the management of cost and resources (i.e., building up potentials
of operational success, with the main system of concern being
S);
–
strategic systems management, in which the focus is on
the management of complexity (i.e., developing steering capacities
in view of uncertainy and change, with the main system of concern
being E); and
–
normative systems management, in which the focus is on
the management of conflict (i.e., building up potentials of
mutual understanding with all the parties concerned).
In
short, the three rationality perspectives can be characterized
to focus on managerial core issues related to the management of cost, of complexity, and of conflict.
To be sure, this is not an entirely new idea. Such multi-level frameworks have been proposed
before, for example by
Jantsch (1970, 1975), Beer (1972
/ 1981), Espejo et al. (1996),
and Schwaninger (2001, 2009). However, while these schemes offer a useful extension
of the management and planning approaches of the fields in which they were developed, among them technological
forecasting and planning, organizational cybernetics, and management theory,
they differ from the scheme suggested here in one important
respect: they are not grounded in practical philosophy.
In the terms of Habermas' typology (Table 1), they remain more
or less
limited to an orientation towards success (with the "less"
applying to Jantsch's framewok, to which we will return below).
Accordingly their
highest level of systems rationalization remains that of strategic
management. They have no means for dealing with the communicative
requirements of conflict management that arise when it comes
to resolving normative issues, including ethical and moral
issues, by means of openly and critically normative argumentation
and discourse. In contrast, the three-level concept of rational
practice suggested here is grounded in practical philosophy
and for this reason can overcome the other schemes' tacit limitation
to a merely managerial and strategic notion of rationality that
remains tied to an orientation to success. The aim of the present
framework reaches further, at what on an earlier occasion I described as vindication beyond mere reference to self-interest, that
is, as an understanding of rationality that includes reference
to the views and values of parties other than those directly
interested and involved – the very core idea of "communicative
rationality" (see Ulrich, 2011a, p. 9f).
These few remarks must suffice here; for a detailed discussion
of the three management levels as understood in the management
literature and in my work on critical systems thinking, I may refer
the reader to the earlier-mentioned essays (Ulrich, 1988, 2001b,
and 2012b).
Two
application examples
To help readers in appreciating the
relevance
of the proposed three-level framework of rational practice,
let us now turn to two major examples of application. I adapt
them here from earlier discussions (see Ulrich, esp. 1988 and 2012b).
First
example: "Stakeholder
management" In the seminal
text on "stakeholder theory," Freeman (1984, p. 46)
defined stakeholders as "any group or individual who can
affect or is affected by the achievement of an organization's
objectives." A similar, slightly shorter definition defines
them as "groups or individuals
who can affect, or are affected by, the organization's mission"
(p. 52). The definition is widely cited and accepted to this day,
yet it is so underspecified that it is hardly useful, in fact,
it glosses over the problems it raises. There is no mentioning
of the boundary judgments involved, and accordingly no specification
of criteria and processes for the boundary critique that would
seem required for critical practice (cf. Achterkamp and
Vos, 2007). Even worse, the definition glosses over the crucial distinction between stakeholders who
are in a position to influence the organization's success or
mission and thus the ways it affects them, and others who
cannot. In the terms of our earlier Fig. 5, doing justice
to stakeholders requires a clear distinction between those involved
and those affected but not involved.
From
a perspective informed by our three-level model of rational
practice, it is indeed crucial to carefully distinguish the
two groups, as they belong to different reference systems. The
first group, inasmuch as it is not identical with those involved
in the organization (reference system: S) belongs to the organization's
decision-environment (reference system: E), which is that
section
of the universe which affects the system but is not part of
it. The second group, in contrast, comprises all those stakeholders
that are or risk being affected without having any influence
upon the organization; they are, in the terms of CSH, the group
of "those affected but not involved" (reference
system: A).
As
soon as one understands the two stakeholder groups in such terms
of boundary critique and related reference systems, it becomes
clear that glossing over their different nature in the way Freeman's
definition does it is bound to lead into an inadequate treatment
of the second group. Its treatment risks being perceived to
be of secondary importance as no repercussions are expected
for S; it is to S part of the "irrelevant" environment
(U) rather than of the "relevant" environment (E).
Not surprisingly, then, stakeholder management has achieved
little in strengthening corporate social responsibility for
all stakeholders, not just for those who are in a position to affect
the corporation's success and whose correct treatment is therefore
in the very interest of corporate management. This is indeed what has happened,
and continues to happen regularly, in the
practice of this so-called "stakeholder theory."
In the
terms of the three-level concept of rational practice, stakeholder theory has remained limited to the
strategic level of systems rationalization. It has no conception
of the normative level and its need for boundary critique oriented
towards careful identification and handling of the context of application
(or of responsible action). This limitation comes as no surprise,
given that stakeholder theory was developed
within the horizon of the strategic management literature. As
a representative text book of strategic management (Thompson
(1997) puts it bluntly, a key concern in taking account of the
needs of different parties concerned by the corporation's aims
and activities is indeed a party's power to affect the corporation's
success:
Stakeholder
theory postulates that the objectives of an organization will
take account of the various needs of these different interested
parties who will represent some type of informal coalition.
Their relative power will be a key variable, and the organization
will on occasions "trade-off" one against the other,
establishing a hierarchy of relative importance. (Thompson,
1997, p. 148)
Mind
you, the stakeholders will be ranked regarding their importance
according to their "relative power" to affect
the organization or its success, not the other way round, according
to the severity of the ways in which they may be affected. In
the terms of Figures 3 and 4 above, what is taken to "matter"
for the organization's response to stakeholder concerns – the
way it will treat these concerns – is the relation X–>S rather
than S–>X; which is to say, the reference system identifying
relevant concerns and rational responses is taken to be E, not
A. In everyday terms: thus-understood stakeholder management
is motivated by the organization's own interests rather than
by the genuine interests and concerns of third parties, particularly
if they have little power. One must wonder, then, what should
be new in stakeholder theory as compared to previous management
theories in its handling of third parties. After all, the reference
systems for assessing managerial or organizational "success"
and related rationality claims remain the same (S/E).
The level
of communicative rationality and its normative core thus remain
outside the conceptual grasp of stakeholder theory. With its
deficient definition of stakeholders, it misses its aim from
the start. The underlying concept of rational practice remains tied to the
idea of building operational and strategic potentials of success, rather than
opening up the universe of discourse to ethical and moral
issues of dealing with genuine conflicts of interests and needs,
of views and values, whereby all the parties concerned would
be treated with equal regard for their concerns, regardless
of the influence they have upon the
organization. The conclusion is inevitable: due to its being
grounded
in strategic management but not also in practical philosophy, stakeholder theory
fails to do justice to the level of normative management and its requirements
of critically-normative discourse. This theoretical deficit
need not
of course preclude that individual managers of good will may still
want to do justice to the concerns of all affected parties;
but such a personal stance will not be a systematic part of the
systems rationality at work. It does not "count"
in the system's measure of success and worse, to the extent
that caring about the interests of third parties may involve
some cost, such managers of good will even risk being accused
of not living up to their full responsibility for the organization's
success.
Stakeholder management
has thus become for managers a lip service paid routinely – a
managerial ritual, so to speak – rather than a new stance of responsibility,
much less a new concept of corporate rationality. As Freeman himself avows in explaining
his above-cited, crucial definition of stakeholders,
the outlook remains basically utilitarian or oriented to "success"
rather than to mutual understanding and cooperation with all
the parties concerned:
From
the standpoint of strategic management, or the achievement of
organizational purpose, we need an inclusive definition. We
must not leave out any group or individual who can affect or
is affected by organizational purpose, because that group
may prevent our accomplishments. Theoretically, therefore,
"stakeholder" must be able to capture a broad range
of groups and individuals, even though when we put the concept
to practical tests we must be willing to ignore certain groups
who will have little or no impact on the corporation at
this point of time. (Freeman, 1984, p. 52f, italics added;
compare also Freeman's additional reference to the "stakeholders whose support is necessary for survival"
on p. 33.)
From
the outset, stakeholder management thus fails to recognize –
or take seriously – the
conflict of rationalities involved. It knows only one type of
rationality, that which serves its own interests. Consequently
it also fails to systematically develop the idea that stakeholding
might serve a self-critical purpose and might to this end be driven by different rationalities
and corresponding action orientations and reference systems.
In the terms of our three-level concept of rational practice
(cf. Table 2 above), it would indeed make a fundamental difference
if corporate managers would approach stakeholders not only with a strategic but
also, and primarily, with a communicative concept of rationality
in mind. So long as stakeholding
relies on an unquestioned strategic concept of rationality,
it will
deal inadequately with the normative level of management and
thereby forsakes much of its potential for improving
management practice. Which after all is what stakeholder theory,
by advancing a supposed alternative to the
classical, economic and managerialist theory of the firm, was
meant
to achieve in the first place.
Second
example: the
"open systems" fallacy A
second example is offered by the so-called open systems approach
in systems thinking. There is a widespread belief in the systems
literature that an "open systems" perspective is more
conducive to societally rational decision making than are conventional
closed systems models. But once again, like in the previous
example, we are facing a claim that
in practice turns out
to be misleading, due to its not being grounded in a clear conception
of the rationality concepts at issue. I analyzed this "open systems fallacy," as
I call it, on three earlier
occasions7) and found it a useful way to explain
one of the core ideas of my work on "critical systems heuristics"
(CSH):
"Open,"
in contrast to "closed," systems models consider the
social environment of the system; but so long as the system's
effectiveness remains the only point of reference, the consideration
of environmental factors does nothing to increase the social
rationality of a systems design. In fact, if the normative orientation
of the system in question is socially irrational, open systems
planning will merely add to the socially irrational effects
of closed systems planning. For instance, when applied to the
planning of private enterprise, the open systems perspective
only
increases the private (capital-oriented) rationality of the
enterprise by expanding its control over the environmental,
societal determinants of its economic success, without regard
for the social costs that such control may impose upon third
parties.
Generally speaking,
a one-dimensional expansion of the reach of functional systems
rationality that is not embedded in a simultaneous expansion
of communicative rationality threatens to pervert the critically
heuristic purpose of systems thinking – to avoid the trap of
suboptimization and to consider critically the whole-systems
implications of any system design – into a mere heuristics of
systems purposes. This means that it is no longer "the
system" and the boundary judgments constitutive of it that
are considered as the problem; instead, the problems of the
system are now investigated. (Ulrich, 1988, p. 156, orig.
italics; with
reference to Ulrich, 1983, p. 299)
Not
unlike what has happened in strategic management theory and management
education, as
illustrated above by the example of so-called stakeholder theory,
systems thinking has become seriously impoverished as it has
lost sight of the other, non-utilitarian dimension of rationality,
a rationality perspective that we have characterized above in terms of social rather than
nonsocial orientation (M. Weber), communicative rather than success-oriented rationality
(Habermas),
or in Kantian terms also as theoretical-instrumental vs. practical-normative
reasoning. The two fields of management thought and systems
thinking also have in common that they both have been influential,
in the past few decades, in shaping our contemporary notions
of good and rational practice – so much so that an effective handling of the
many pressing problems of our epoch is now almost synonymous
with calls for more systemic thinking and for stakeholder management.
However, the promise of these two approaches is unlikely to
be fulfilled so long as the underlying rationality concepts are
impoverished.
Accordingly
imperative it is that the two-dimensional nature of rationality
receive more attention and become an integral part of the "open
systems" approach, no less than of stakeholder management.
This should happen
in a manner that would clarify the
mutual relationship of the two dimensions and strike a better
balance between them, that is, strengthen the communicative
dimension and with it the critically-normative issues that
it entails. As long as we merely see in the latter dimension
an added consideration that is "nice to have" but, regrettably, often clashes with the
need for successful action under pressures of time and money, little will change. Since the two
dimensions often clash, it is indeed difficult to think and argue
clearly and consistently about what constitutes good and rational practice.
Again a Kantian handling of the two dimensions gives us the
crucial hint: we can avoid unresolved rationality conflicts between them by bringing them into a vertical order,
so that their relationship and ranking become clear and do justice to
their nature or to what Kant (1786) calls the primacy of
practical reason. In everyday terms we might speak of the
means character of theoretical-instrumental
reason as related to the selection of ends that
must inform it and which in turn is to be guided
by practical-normative (including moral) reasoning and corresponding,
critically-normative discourse.
A multi-level conception
of rational practice as proposed in Table 2 offers a relevant,
practical framework for such two-dimensional systems thinking,
lest it remain a mere ideal. It
frees "open" systems thinking from being tacitly and
unquestioningly tied to a merely instrumental, success-oriented
concept of rationality; a concept of rationality that extends
the reference system from S to E but has no grasp of A, and which
for this reason also achieves little in the way of bringing into play the level of
communicative rationality. The crucial point, as we have well
understood by now, is that a mere expansion
of systems boundaries from S to E does not at all achieve a
change of the rationality perspective at work; for the
assumed reference systems for measuring successful and rational
action remains the same (S/E). Only the conceptual move to a different
reference system, the context of application (A), implies a
substantial shift of the rationality perspective at work; which
is what the suggested framework achieves with the move to the
third level of communicative rationality.
Generally speaking, then,
reflective practice calls not only for an
extension of our horizon of considerations but also for a conscious change
of the standpoint from which we seek to extend it. A mere expansion
of systems boundaries does not achieve this, as the underlying
rationality remains basically the same. Within a framework of conventional
systems thinking, chances are that an expanded "systems
rationality" (sic) will remain focused on the
success of the system of interest. It will thus tend to remain
subject to a strategic (i.e., utilitarian) rather than communicative
(critically-normative) handling of the social aspects of the situation.
The open systems fallacy occurs when our systems thinking aims
at an expansion of rationality without being embedded in a reflective
and communicative effort of challenging the notions of
rationality in play (cf. Ulrich, 1988, p. 156f).
Open
systems thinking that understands the issue becomes critical
systems thinking. Its methodological focus will
be on systematically questioning the different reference systems – the sets
of boundary judgments, that is – that inform the "facts"
and "values" (or the considerations and concerns)
taken to be relevant for judging situations and assessing good and rational
action. This is of course what CSH's core principle and major
tool of boundary critique is all about. By explicitly
integrating the concept of boundary critique into the three-level
concept of rational practice (an aspect that was still only
implicit in the framework's earlier versions of 1988, 2001,
and 2012), I hope that both concepts as well as their interdependence
have gained in clarity and critically-heuristic power, so that
they can support one another in the never ending quest for good
and reflective practice.
I
would like to conclude this discussion on the meaning and use
of reference systems in boundary critique with a hint at one
more methodological principle that is apt to guide critically-normative
practice along the lines suggested in this essay, I call it
the principle of critical
vertical integration of rationalization levels.
I adopt it, once again, from an earlier account (Ulrich, 2012b,
pp. 37-39).
Final
consideration: the principle of critical vertical integration
The term "vertical integration"
was to my knowledge first used by Erich Jantsch (1969a, p. 54f;
1969b, p. 190f) in
the context of technological forecasting and planning. He used
it to
refer to the integration of all its tasks – "activities"
or "functions,"
as he called them, such as exploring and assessing existent technologies;
anticipating and designing technological futures; and defining
objectives and policies for the "joint systems of society
and technology" (p. 8) – within a systems-theoretically
and scientifically based framework of policy sciences,
a field emerging in the 1950s and 60s (the seminal publication is Lerner and Lasswell, 1951).
Jantsch calls such an integration of forecasting and planning
functions "vertical," in distinction to the need for
considering, in each stage of technology development, the larger
context of the different
subsystems involved (man-technology, nature-technology, and
society-technology), to which he referred as "horizontal"
integration.
In
a slightly broader perspective, exploring the integration of
human design with an evolutionary perspective, Jantsch (1975, pp. 123, 209, 224) also speaks of "vertical centering," in a sense that
comes closer to what I mean with the vertical
integration of rationality levels. I can best explain my intention
by means of a graph that I equally owe to Jantsch (esp. 1975, p. 209).
Adapting it to our present aim of grounding the notion of rational
practice in practical philosophy rather than in management and
planning theory (along with systems thinking), and consequently
integrating the level of communicative rationality, we get the
following scheme (Fig. 6).
Fig. 6: The principle of vertical integration of rationalization
levels
"Critical
vertical integration" is a major principle that helps to
understand and apply the three-level concept of rational practice
proposed above properly. (Source:
adapted from Jantsch, 1975, p. 209, and Ulrich, 1975, p. 75)
The graphic
part of the scheme (but not the revised text) betrays its origin in cybernetic thinking and more specifically,
in Ozbekhan's (1969, p. 132f) notion
of "controlling feedback" loops, according to which
"each distinct level of action is controlled by feedback
emanating from a different level of the hierarchy" – the
idea that provided the inspiration for Jantsch's original graph. In my own
understanding of such integrative multi-level thinking, Ozbekhan's
and Jantsch's planning levels become levels
of rational practice in general. As the previous discussion should also
have made clear, I do not follow Ozbekhan and Jantsch
in their cybernetic rather than moral and political
understanding of "control." The
point is not
to adapt plans or actions to supposedly objective or
natural requirements of the planning "environment" (reference
system: E)
but rather, to subject them to the views and values of those
who may have to live with the consequences (reference system:
A) – the communicative
dimension of rationality. Accordingly, the different
levels of thought are to guide rationality critique (including
boundary critique) rather than just managerial control of "turbulent"
environments so as to achieve "organizational stability,"
as a famous concept of the epoch had it (Emery and Trist, 1969,
pp. 248-253).
The fact
that the idea of communicative
rationality was not available to Ozbekhan and Jantsch at the
time may explain why their frameworks for technological planning
and policy "sciences" remain strangely apolitical
and do not (or at least, not systematically) take up the ethical
and moral
questions involved, despite frequent references
to values and "normative" forms of planning. Again,
the difference is that Ozbekhan and Jantsch did not ground their
notion of rational policy-making in practical philosophy but
on the contrary, aimed to extend the reach of science into practical-normative
territory (compare my discussion,
in Ulrich, 2012a, pp. 6-9, of these
two opposite approaches to improving practice).
Where
I agree with Jantsch and Ozbekhan is that integrative multi-level
thinking, and thus (in our case) well-understood instrumental,
strategic, and communicative rationalization of practice, should
always move (or perhaps better, communicate) between and across the different levels at which ends and means,
and with them also values and consequences, can be defined and
questioned. Only thus can each level of rationalization infuse meaning (cf.
Ozebekhan, 1969, p. 133) into the other levels, whether
(as I'd like to add) in the form of direction (e.g., guidance,
support) or challenge (e.g., questioning of reference systems,
unfolding of selectivity and partiality). Consequently, each of our three levels of rational
practice also call for examination (and implicitly, again, for
communication) from both a top-down and a bottom-up
perspective. To handle the three levels reflectively, we therefore need to conceptualize means and ends
at no less than five levels, as suggested by the middle
column in Fig. 6 above:
- Norms
of action: highest standards or principles of action
(e.g., moral and democratic
principles); they shape our values and ideals.
- Normative
ends: standards of improvement defined by personal
and institutional values and by related notions of intended
consequences; they shape our policies.
- Strategic
ends: objectives defined by policies; they shape
our strategies and tactics of action.
- Operational
ends: goals defined by strategies and tactics;
they shape specific operations or procedures
of action. And finally,
- Means:
basic resources defined by available sources of support;
they shape the feasibility and efficiency
of action.
We
may then understand our three levels of rational practice to
function as communication channels or platforms, as intersections
at which different needs and notions of rationalizations meet
and can convey meaning and challenges to one another. Such communication
across systems levels or, implicitly, across the boundaries
of different reference systems, is indispensable with a view
to recognition and integration of competing or clashing rationality
requirements. We
may consequently also capture the
idea of a mandatory process of moving up and down the hierarchy
by referring to the three rationalization levels
as integrative levels, a concept that to my knowledge
Feiblemann (1954)
was first to explain systematically, although still in a context
of mainly functional thinking (e.g., in biology and ecology).
In the present context I understand integrative levels as conceptual
levels of rationality that gain their full meaning and validity
only in the light of a combined, or "integrative," multi-level perspective. The practical way to implement this
idea is by an iterative process of vertical centering:
each level
is at regular intervals (iteratively rather than permanently) to
be in the center
of systematic review both from above and from below.
This
way of visualizing and describing the idea of vertical integration should also
remind us that each of
the three concepts of rationality has to play a critical role with respect to the other two. Each level is to help
us "discipline" the claims to rationality of the others,
as it were. Vertical integration is first of
all rationality critique. It is a
principle of reflective practice. It understands rational action
as the result of a self-reflecting and communicative process
of rigorous scrutiny of its
assumptions and implications across the three levels of rationalization.
Speaking of vertical integration
is thus really just a convenient short formula for what is more
precisely called the principle of critical vertical integration.
To
be sure, vertical
integration is not meant to replace horizontal integration but rather to give it a new depth, so to speak. Rationality
critique has both a horizontal and a vertical dimension; both
matter in boundary critique. A well-understood
"open systems" perspective will henceforth question
our reference systems,
and unfold their implications, in both horizontal and vertical
direction. Horizontally, it will enlarge our
view of situations by expanding the reference systems considered;
vertically, it will deepen our understanding of situations by
shifting our standpoint and perspective between essentially
different reference systems.
The
three-level concept of rational practice thus translates into
a process of systematic rationality review. In a deliberate reversal of my earlier-quoted critical
comment on the open systems fallacy, systems rationality will
then no longer focus exclusively on the "problems
of the system" but will instead consider "the
system" and the boundary judgments constitutive of it as a core
problem of any understanding of "rational" practice.
We've
come full circle, back to what Robert Pirsig, in the quote from
Zen or the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance that serves
as a motto for this essay, described as a key confusion of our
time: "The
true system," he wrote, "the real system, is our present construction of
systematic thought itself, rationality itself.… There's so much
talk about the system. And so little understanding." (Pirsig, 1975,
p. 94) Would it
be all too presumptuous to hope that we may have
lessened this lack of understanding just a little bit?
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